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PREFACE 
Standard setting is one of the most commonly used regula- 
tory tools to limit detrimental effects of technologies on human 
health, safety, and psychological well being. Standards also 
work as major constraints on technological development, parti- 
cularly in the energy field. The trade-offs which have to be 
made between economical, engineering, environmental, and politi- 
cal objectives, the high uncertainty about environmental effects, 
and the conflicting interests of groups involved in standard 
setting, make the regulatory task exceedingly difficult. 
Realizing this difficulty, the Volkswagen Foundation spon- 
sored a research subtask in IIASA's Energy Program under the 
name "Procedures for the Establishment of Standards". The ob- 
jectives of this research are to analyze existinq yrocedures for 
standard setting and to develop new techniques to improve the 
regulatory decision making process. The research performed under 
this project include: 
i) policy analyses of the institutional aspects of 
standard setting and comparisons with other 
regulatory tools; 
ii) case studies of ongoing or past standard setting 
processes (e.g. oil discharge standards or noise 
standards) ; 
iii) development of formal methods for standard setting 
based on dscision and game theory; 
iv) applications of these methods to real world standard 
setting problems. 
The present research memorandum is one in a series of papers 
dealing with the developmentand application of decision theoretic 
methods to standard setting. It presents the formal basis of the 
decision theoretic model for standard setting. 

ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a decision theoretic model which was 
developed to aid regulatory agencies in standard setting and 
regulation tasks. The one stage three decision maker model 
encompasses the decision making of a regulator, a developer, and 
an impactee unit. Each decision unit is assumed to follow a 
basic decision model, which is a combination of a probability 
model, a difference value judgment model, and an expected utility 
model. The developer unit is linked to the regulator unit 
through possible detections of violations of a regulation and 
sanctions. The impactee unit is linked to the developer unit 
through pollution generating events stemming from the developer's 
actions, and the subsequent damages which may result from 
pollution. 
This basic regulation model is then specified to safety 
and emission standard setting. Central in these specifications 
is a signal detection model which characterizes the uncertainty 
with which the regulator will detect or miss violatioris of his 
regulation. A multistage conditional probability model links 
the developer's actions, pollution generating events, amounts 
of pollutants, and possible effects on impactees. 

A DECISION THEORETIC MODEL FOR STANDARD SETTING AND REGULATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Setting standards such as emission or ambient standards 
on chemicals polluting the air or the water is one of the most 
widely used regulatory tools to limit the negative effects of 
industrial activities on human health, safety, and psychological 
well being. Scientists and administrators in regulatory agen- 
cies who have to set such standards agree that the task is 
exceedingly difficult. There usually exists a vast amount of 
uncertainty about the effects of pollutants on human well being. 
Crucial trade-offs have to be made among multiple objectives 
which are often conflicting such as engineering, economic, 
political and environmental objectives. Conflicting interest 
groups are involved in standard setting each backing their case 
with different expert reports. 
Since standard setting decisions are important, recurrent 
and exceedingly difficult, several attempts have been made to 
develop procedures along which a regulator and his experts can 
organize their information collection and evaluation tasks. 
Several authors have suggested and applied cost benefit analysis 
to solve the problem of standard setting and regulation (see, 
for example, Dorfman and Jacoby, 1970; North and Merkhofer, 
1975; Karam and Morgan, 1975). But decision makers and scien- 
tists are often skeptical about the use of cost benefit analysis 
for such complex problems. The main reasons for this skepticism 
are that many values can not be expressed in Dollar terms and 
that the political character of the decision process is not 
taken into account (see, for example, Holden, 1966; Majone, 
1976; Reports by the US Academy of Sciences, 1975; and by the 
National Research Council, 1977). 
To aid regulators and scientists in standard setting tasks, 
therefore, new procedures and methods are called for. These 
procedures could include new institutional mechanisms (e-g. 
public participation, science courts, etc.) and new "softer" 
modeling approaches (e.g. decision theory and game theory). 
This paper concentrates on the second type of procedural 
innovation. It presents a formal decision theoretic model that 
was designed to help regulators to structure a standard setting 
task, to express uncertainties in a quantifiable form, and to 
evaluate alternative regulation and standards in the light of 
conflicting objectives. The paper is addressed mainly to 
decision theorists and operation researchers who are interested 
in the quantitative aspects of the model. Readers interested 
in the qualitative model structure are referred to von Winter- 
feldt (1978), and Fischer and von Winterfeldt (1978). 
The paper is organized as follows. First the general deci- 
sion theoretic model for a single decision maker will be devel- 
oped. Readers familiar with measurement and decision theory 
on the level of DeGroot (1970), Fishburn (1970) and Krantz, 
Luce, Suppes and Tversky (1971) may wish to skip this part. 
The second section adapts the single decision maker model to a 
regulation model in which the decision making of a regulator, 
developer (producer) and impactee (sufferer) unit are linked. 
The third part of the paper details the general regulation 
model to the specific circumstances of standard setting. 
BASIC DECISION MODEL FOR A SINGLE DECISION MAKER 
The following mathematical formulation of the basic decision 
theoretic model is a modified version of the usual expected 
utility model (von Neumann and Morgenstern,l947) which is devel- 
oped, for example in Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961), DeGroot (1970) 
and Fishburn (1970). It differs from the basic expected 
utility formulation in two aspects: first, it does not assume 
that conditional on event and action combinations final conse- 
quences can be predicted with certainty, but it leaves the 
possibility that there is a residual uncertainty about final 
consequences; second, it does not directly construct a von Neu- 
mann and Morgenstern utility function, but rather constructs it 
through an additive difference value function which can be shown 
to be functionally related to a von Neumann and Morgenstern 
utility function. 
Let A be the set of decision alternatives (courses of 
action) with typical elements a,bEA. Let S be a set of mutu- 
ally exclusive and exha~stive events with typical elements 
n 
s,tES. Let C = X Ci be a subset of Rn which characterizes the 
i=l 
possible consequences of act-event combinations. Typical ele- 
ments of C are n-dimensional vectors c, d. Finally, let Z be 
the set of possible information sources with typical elements 
y,z EZ. 
The model assumes that the decision maker and his experts 
can quantify their uncertainty by a judgmental probability dis- 
tribution (pd) over events and a probability density function 
(pdf) over consequences: 
1) A probability distribution p which assigns to each event 
s ES a probability P (s 1 a, z) depending on information source 
z and act a. 
2) A probability density function f which assigns to each point 
c EC a probability density f (cla,s,z), depending on an act a, 
- 
event s and information source z. 
The residual uncertainty expressed in f can often be re- 
presented by independent marginal pdfs fi. Therefore the follow- 
ing assumptions can be made: 
where c i  E Ci .  
The t o t a l  u n c e r t a i n t y  a b o u t  consequences g i v e n  a n  a c t  a  
and i n f o r m a t i o n  s o u r c e  z  can  t h e n  be e x p r e s s e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
pdf g : 
The s e t  o f  a l l  such p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n s  w i l l  be 
c a l l e d  F w i t h  t y p i c a l  e l ements  f , gEF ,  
The model assumes f u r t h e r  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker h a s  p r e -  
f e r e n c e s  among p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n s ,  which can  be  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  o r d e r e d  s e t  < F , ?  >. The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  
"f >g" i s  t h a t  "f i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  o r  i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  g" .  The 
assumpt ion  which w i l l  be made i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i s  t h a t  < F , ? >  
i s  a n  expec ted  u t i l i t y  s t r u c t u r e ,  i . e .  t h a t  2 obeys t h e  axioms 
o f  expec ted  u t i l i t y  t h e o r y  ( s e e  von Neumann and Morgenstern ,  
1947; Savage, 1954; F i s h b u r n ,  1970) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  
f u n c t i o n  u: c-+@ such t h a t  f o r  a l l  f , ~ E F  
i f  and o n l y  i f  
Next,  t h e  model assumes t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker o r  h i s  ex- 
p e r t s  can e x p r e s s  t h e i r  s t r e n g t h  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  of  one conse-  
quence o v e r  a n o t h e r ,  which can  be  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  o r d e r e d  
s e t  <CxC, ?>. The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  " ( c , d )  - - 2 ( c '  - , d '  - )" i s  t h a t  " t h e  
d e g r e e  of  p r e f e r e n c e  o f  c o v e r  d is  l a r g e r  o r  e q u a l  t o  t h e  
d e g r e e  of  p r e f e r e n c e  o f  c ' o v e r  a ' " .  I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  assump- 
t i o n  w i l l  be made t h a t  <CXC,>> 7s an a l g e b r a i c  d i f f e r e n c e  
s t r u c t u r e  i . e .  t h a t  3 obeys  t h e  axioms of  a l g e b r a i c  d i f f e r e n c e  
measurement (Suppes and Winet ,  1955; Kran tz ,  Luce, Suppes and 
Tversky,  1971) .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  f u n c t i o n  v :  
c-+@ such t h a t  f o r  a l l  c , d , c ' , d l E C  
- - -  - 
i f  and o n l y  i f  
Both functions v and u express some evaluation aspect about 
consequences C, but there is no basis in the assumptions behind 
(3) and (4) that would establish a relationship between them. 
In particular there is no reason to assume that the expectation 
of v preserves the preference order of f,gEF. To distinguish, 
u will be called a utility function, and v will be called a 
value function. 
The remainder of the model description for the single 
decision maker will be concerned with establishing decomposition 
forms of u and v and functional relationships between u and v. 
In particular, independence assumptions on preferences among 
pdfs and on preference strength judgments will be made that lead 
to additive or multiplicative decompositions of u and v into 
single consequence functions ui and v.. Some further assump- 
tions will then be used to show that the relationship between u 
and v must be either linear or exponential. 
The reason for this type of model formulation is largely 
pragmatic. Assuming that v is additive, single consequence 
difference value functions vi can be assessed through rather 
simple preference strength judgments. Given that u and v are 
related by a simple function, one can then construct a utility 
function u from v by assessing the parameters of the trans- 
formation either through sensitivity analysis or by asking a 
few simple insurance type questions. Thus the construction 
process, while ending with a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility 
function, circumvents the sometimes awkward lottery assessment 
methods which would have to be used otherwise. In addition, 
this type of model has the advantage of separating clearly be- 
tween concepts of "marginal utility" (which has a place in the 
algebraic difference structure) and "risk attitude" (which has 
a place in the expected utility structure). 
As a first step the preference relation and the preference 
strength relations are coupled. Preferences Z are defined over 
F, but they can easily be applied to C by defining 
if and only if 
f (2) = g(d) = 1 and f z g  . 
Another induced preference relation can be defined by 
if and only if 
1 II 
Nothing guarantees that t =  2 .  However, from a judgmental point 
of view this equality seems plausible. Therefore, the following 
assumption will be made: 
For all c,dEC 
- - 
if and only if 
If tbere age no ambiguities L will from now on be substituted 
for t and 2. 
From definitions (5) and (6) and from assumption (7) it 
is obvious that there exists a functional relationship between 
u and v and that this relationship must be monotonically in- 
creasing: 
u (c)> u@) if and only if 
I {by 3 and 5) 
c 2 d  
- - 
if and only if 
I! (by 7) 
c t d  
- - 
if and only if 
(by 6) 
(c,?) 5 (d,d) - if andonly if 
(by 4) 
v(c) 2 v(d), for all c,dEC. 
- - - 
Thus u and v are both order preserving functions for pre- 
ference over C and by the uniqueness of such functions (see 
Suppes and Zinnes, 1963; Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky, 
1971) two such functions rnust be related through a monotonically 
increasing transfamation u=h(v). 
Next, the assumption will be made that v is additive: 
In the appendix an independence condition for 2 is defined 
and a proof is given that this independence condition is suffi- 
cient for (9). 
With respect to the decomposition of u, two possibilities 
are considered in the model: 
Either 
n 
(10) and (11) are the classic decomposition forms of u in 
expected utility theory, and independence assumptions and 
proofs for these forms can be found, for example in Fishburn, 
1970; Keeney, 1974; Keeney and Raiffa,1976. 
The uniqueness property of additive value functions (see 
Fishburn, 1970; Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky, 1971) states 
that any two additive order preserving functions defined on C 
must be related by a positive linear transformation. From this 
uniqueness property and assuming (9) and (10) the following 
relationship between v and u results: 
u = av + B for some a>O, f3ER . (12) 
Again using the uniqueness property, but this time assuming 
(9j and (11) an exponential relationship results: 
for some a>o,B if k>o I 
In (13) a is a risk attitude parameter which, unlike usual 
risk parameters (see Raiffa, 1968), is not confounded with 
marginal value considerations. Marginal value considerations 
are expressed solely in v. The relationship between a and k is 
that a>o if k>o and a<o if k<o. If k=o then (12) holds. These 
results are proven and discussed in the appendix. 
With definitions and assumptions (1 ) - (1 3) an evaluation 
function U can now be defined on AxZ which is consistent with 
a rational decision maker's preference and probability judgments: 
where h is either linear or exponential as defined in (12) and 
(13). 
Given the appropriate choice of the functions like pIfIhI 
and v the decision rule that logically follows from the assump- 
tion made is: 
select a* € A  with 
U(a*,z) = max U(a,z). 
A 
Clearly one could also maximize over Z, the possible in- 
formation sources. This would amount to a value of information 
analysis. Within the proposed model this could be done provided 
that the cost of information is included in the consequence 
space C. More specific models which assume additive costs of 
information and decisions could also be considered. Further- 
more, additional information could be considered (e.g. a research 
study, an independent expert estimate) and a so called pre- 
posterior analysis of the value of additional information could 
be carried out (see Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961). 
The model allows a simple construction of the model func- 
tions. Decision theoretic techniques are available to con- 
struct pdfs, pds, and value functions in (14), and some of them 
have been developed to a high degree of sophistication. To 
construct pds odds comparison techniques caa be used (see 
Spetzler and von Holstein, 1975). To construct pdfs over conti- 
nuous random variables one would use either of two techniques: 
the fractile method (see Brown, Peterson and Kahr, 1974) or 
direct probability estimation techniques (see Spetzler and von 
Holstein, 1975). To construct the value function v rating and 
weighting techniques can be used which approximate quite close- 
ly the theoretically feasible techniques of using indifference 
judgments about value differences (Edwards, 1971). Within model 
(14) the transformation h from v into u is already so restricted 
that a few questions about insurance behavior and risk prefer- 
ences should be sufficient to assess the parameters of the ex- 
ponential form. If the transformation h is linear, one can use 
the value function directly as input into (14) without choosing 
transformation constants IY, and B ,  since utility functions are 
unique up to a linear positive transformation (see Krantz et al., 
1971; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). 
THE DECISION MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
In regulatory decision making the decision theoretic model 
described above becomes much more complicated, since several 
decision makers (or better: decision making units, organizations) 
are involved rather than an individual. These decision units 
have their own objectives, alternatives, and opinions. In a 
previous study on regulatory decision making (Fischer and von 
Winterfeldt, 1978) five main decision units were identified 
which enter into regulatory decision making. Generically they 
are called here: 
1. the regulator unit 
2. the developer unit 
3. the im?actee unit 
4 the expert unit 
5. the exogenous unit 
The regula-tar unit consists of the people and institutions 
that have the responsibility for setting regulations as, for 
example, the Centrzl Unit for Environmental Pollution in the UK, 
the State Pollution Control Agency in Norway, or the EPA in the 
US. The developer unit is defined as all those people and 
organizations whose span of decision alternatives is restricted 
by the regulation. In the impactee unit all those groups are 
combined whose activities or perceptions are impacted upon by 
the development activities. The expert unit consists of re- 
searchers and other experts that can provide information bearing 
on the regulatory problem. The exogenous unit is defined as 
those national or international organizations which constrain 
the decision making of the regulatory unit. 
A good first approximation to the regulation problem was 
found to be achieved by considering the first three decision 
units only, and by identifying the elements of the expert unit 
with sources of information z E  Z. The resulting regulator- 
developer-impactee model has a structure which is schematically 
represented in Fig.1. 
Each decision unit has its own alternatives (as well as 
sets of relevant events, information sources, consequence 
spaces, pdfs, value functions, etc.). If the regulator decides 
on a particular regulation alternative r, the decision making 
of the developer will be influenced by the possibility of sanc- 
tions if violations of the regulation r are detected. Thus the 
developer will respond to a regulation r by an action d(r) which 
may not be an action he would have taken without regulation. 
Through pollution and their adverse effect on health and 
well being the developer influences the decision making of the 
impactee unit. In response to a developer deci.sion d, the im- 
pactees will choose an action a(d) which may not be the action 
which they would have taken without the development activity. 
The idea of the model is to determine optimal decisions 
d(r) and a[d(r)l for the developer and the impactee as a func- 
tion of r, together with the associated utilities UR(r) ,UD[d (r) 1 ,  
uA{a[d(r)]). Further aggregation or Pareto optimality analysis 
pay then be used to focus on a "good" value of r. 
In the regulator-developer-impactee model each unit is 
represented by model (14). The notational specifications are 
given in Table 1. 
EVENTS & EFFECTS ALTERNATIVES DECISION EVALUATION 
REGULATORY 
DECISION 
DETECTION OF 
REGULATION 
DEVELOPER 
T\ DECISION 
UDld(r) I 
A 
SANCTIONS 
GENERATING 
EVENTS 
DECISION 
ALTERNATIVE 
Figure 1 .  Schematic Representation of the Regulator-Developer- 
Impactee Model 
T a b l e  1 .  N ~ t a t i o n  f o r  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n  Model 
S e t  Element 
R e g u l a t o r ' s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
D e v e l o p e r ' s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
Impactee" a l t e r n a t i v e s  
R e g u l a t o r ' s  consequences  C~ 
Developer ' s consequences  C~ 
I m p a c t e e ' s  consequences  C~ 
R e g u l a t o r ' s  e v e n t s  
D e v e l o p e r ' s  e v e n t s  
I m p a c t e e ' s  e v e n t s  
The f u n c t i o n s .  p d s ,  and p d f s  pR,pD.pA,f  R, f  D, f  A , ~ R , ~ D , ~ A T  
h  h  h  a r e  a l s o  assumed. For  s i m p l i c i t y  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  R f  Dl A 
s o u r c e s  Z R ~ ~ D ~ ~ A  a r e  n o t  s p e l l e d  o u t  any more and it i s  i m p l i -  
c i t l y  unders tood  t h a t  a l l  pds  and p d f s  o f  a  d e c i s i o n  u n i t  a r e  
c o n d i t i o n e d  on a n  e lement  z from t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  s o u r c e  Z .  
be long ing  t o  h i s  u n i t .  
Without  s p e c i f y i n g  i n t e r l i n k a g e  models " d e t e c t i o n  o f  v i o l a - -  
t i o n  and s a n c t i o n 1 '  and " p o l l u t i o n  g e n e r a t i o n  and e f f e c t s "  t h e  
e v a l u a t i o n  o f  a c t s  f o r  each  d e c i s i o n  u n i t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  model 
(1 4 )  depends o n  -the a c t s  of  o t h e r  u n i t s ,  s i n c e  p -  and f a r e  
dependent  on  a l l  a c t s :  
where " * "  s t a n d s  f o r  R ,  D ,  and A r e s p e c t i v e l y .  L e t  Qo and Q ,  
d e n o t e  t h e  e v e n t s  "non-de tec t ion"  and " d e t e c t i o n "  o f  a  r e g u l a -  
t i o n  v i o l a t i o n ,  and l e t  s l ,  s ~ , . . . . , ~  be t h e  set  o f  p o l l u t i o n  
g e n e r a t i n g  e v e n t s  ( e . g .  e x p l o s i o n s ,  normal o p e r a t i o n  o f  equip-. 
ment. e t c . ) .  The model d e f i n e s  SR = 6 ,  SD = {Qo,Q1} and SA = 
{ S , ~ S ~ . . . ~ S ~ }  . The f o l l o w i n g  c r u c i a l  independence  assump- 
t i o n s  a r e  now made t o  s i m p l i f y  (1 5 )  : 
Verbally, these assumptions mean that: 
( 1 6 )  T h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o n l y  d e p e n d  o n  h i s  o w n  a c t i o n ;  
( 1 7 )  D e t e c t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  d o  n o t  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  i m p a c t e e ' s  
a c t i o n ;  
( 1 8 )  T h e  d e v e l o p e r ' s  c o n s e q u e n c e s  d o  n o t  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  i m -  
p a c t e e ' s  a c t i o n ;  
( 1 9 )  P o l l u t i o n  g e n e r a t i n g  e v e n t  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  d e p e n d  o n l y  
o n  t h e  d e v e l o p e r ' s  a c t i o n ;  
( 2 0 )  T h e  i m p a c t e e ' s  c o n s e q u e n c e s  d o  n o t  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  r e g u l a -  
t o r ' s  a c t i o n .  
Therefore (15) can be written as follows: 
Independence of Ci, additivity of v, and the linear or exponen- 
tial form of h lead to a further refinement of (21) - (23). De- 
fining the optimal decisions of the developer and the impactee 
by 
d(r) : UD[d(r) ,r] 2 UD(d,r) for all d E D  , (24 
a(d) : UA[a(d) ,dl 2 UA(a,d) for all a E A , (25) 
model (14) applied to all three decision units allows the deter- 
mination of the optimal responses of the developer and impactee 
to a regulation r as well as the associated utilities UR(r), 
UD [d (r) ,r] and uA{a [d (r) 1 ,d (r) 1 for all three units as a func- 
tion of r. A Pareto optimality analysis can now be performed 
on t h e  U , o r ,  a s  a  f i n a l  s t e p ,  one  c o u l d  p o s t u l a t e  f o r  some A .  
w i t h  t h e  o p t i m a l  r e g u l a t i o n  d e f i n e d  a s  
r* : ( r *  2 r f o r  a l l  r E  R . 
THE DECISION MODEL, FOR STANDARD SETTING 
Model ( 1 5 )  - ( 2 7 )  w i l l  now b e  a d a p t e d  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c i r -  
cumstances  a r i s i n g  i n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  a s  a  p a r t i -  
c u l a r  t y p e  o f  r e g u l a t i o n .  The r e g u l a t o r ' s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  R w i l l  
b e  f u r t h e r  s p e c i f i e d  and t h e  d e t e c t i o n  and consequence  p roba -  
b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  and  d e v e l o p e r  w i l l  be  decomposed. 
F i r s t ,  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  a l t e r n a t i v e s  R i n  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  
a r e  d e f i n e d  t o  c o n s i s t  o f  a  set  o f  s t a n d a r d s  SL, a  set  of  moni- 
t o r i n g  and i n s p e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  SM, and a  se t  o f  p o s s i b l e  
sanct ions f o r  v i o l a t i o n s  SS. T y p i c a l  e l e m e n t s  w i l l  b e  l a b e l l e d  
s l ,  s m ,  and ss r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The d e v e l o p e r ' s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  D 
a r e  t h o u g h t  o f  a s  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  p r o c e s s e s ,  e q u i p m e n t s ,  and 
o p e r a t i o n s  t o  r e d u c e  p o l l u t i o n  r i s k s  and h a z a r d s .  The i m p a c t e e ' s  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  n o t  f u r t h e r  s p e c i f i e d ,  and o f t e n  t r e a t e d  a s  a  
dummy v a r i a b l e ,  i . e .  t h e  i m p a c t e e s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  " s u f f e r e r s " .  
Two c l a s s e s  o f  s t a n d a r d s  c a n  be  d i s t i n g u i s h e d :  s a f e t y  
s t a n d a r d s  a r e  s e t  by t h e  r e g u l a t o r  on  D d i r e c t l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  
r e d u c e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of u n d e s i r e d  e v e n t s  SA; e m i s s i o n  s t a n -  
d a r d s  a r e  se t  on  amounts  o r  r a t e s  o f  p o l l u t i o n  i n  t h o s e  c a s e s  
I n  which f o r  any c h o i c e  o f  d E D  t h e  e v e n t  "normal  o p e r a t i o n "  
c a n  be  t a k e n  f o r  g r a n t e d ,  b u t  when s u c h  normal  o p e r a t i o n s  
g e n e r a t e  a c o n s t a n t  f l o w  o f  p o l l u t i o n .  
S a f e t y  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  f i r s t .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  SL i s  
d e f i n e d s l % e  set- a l l  s u b s e t s  o f  D .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  i f  
s l  E S L ,  t h e n  s l C D  . D i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  e x i s t  o f  m u t u a l l y  ex-  
c l u s i v e  e l e m e n t s .  
A v i o l a t i o n  o f  s l  o c c u r s  i f  d F s l ,  o t h e r w i s e  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  
i s  a d h e r e d  t o .  The model assumes t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  c a n n o t  p e r -  
f e c t l y  d i s c r i m i n a t e  w h e t h e r  d E s l  o r  d F s l ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  l i m i t s  
o f  h i s  m o n i t o r i n g  and  i n s p e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  smESM. I n s t e a d  o f  d  
t h e  r e g u l a t o r  p e r c e i v e s   ED w i t h  a p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
P (a 1 d ,  s m )  which d e p e g d s  o n  d  and s m  o n l y .  A r e g u l a t i o n  v i o l a -  
t i o n  i s  d e t e c t e d  i f  d F s l ,  n o t  d e t e c t e d  i f  GEsl .  D e t e c t i o n  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  ( 1 7 )  c a n  now b e  s p e c i f i e d :  
This formulation leavss the possibility open that the regulator 
detects a violation (dvsl) when in fact no such violation 
occurred (dEsl) and vice versa. In signal-detection theory 
(Green and Swets, 1967) these cases are called "false alarm" 
and "miss". 
The safety standards model assumes further that conse- 
quences accruing to the developer as expressed in (18) depend 
on regulatory action only through detections and sanctions: 
The total consequence distribution is then 
Turning now to the consequence distribution of the impactee, 
let IELC~? be an amount or rate of pollution which is considered 
a random variable with pdf f (1 Is.). 
3 
The safety standards model assumes that, given 1, the con- 
sequences accruing to the impactees do not depend any more on d 
and s : j 
Therefore, (2) can be written as 
Event probabilities s are assumed to be independent of im- 
pactee actions aEA: j 
pA(sj 1d.a) = pA(s. 3 Id) . ( 3 4 )  
Therefore the total consequence distribution for the impactee 
unit is: 
These specifications leave the regulator unit unchanged, 
thus (21) still is the regulator's utility function. But sub- 
stituting (31) into (22) and (35) into (23) gives new utility 
functions for the developer and the impactee. The three full 
utility functions for the safety standards model are 
d(r), a[d(r)], arid c(r) are determined as in (241, (25) and (26). 
The emission standard version of the model defines sl not 
as a subset of Dl but rather as an element of L. slEL is inter- 
preted as a maximum admissible amount of emission. S A  is now 
assumed to consist only of one element, say s the event of 1 '  
"normal operation" of dED for all d. This leads to 
pA(sj(d) = 1 for j = 1 
PA(s:ld) J = o for j + 1 (39 
Let lE~C61 be the amount or rate of emissions under sl and d 
with pdF f (llsl,d). Since sl is the same for all developer 
decisions d, it will from now on be dropped. 
The regulator tries to establish whether l>sl (violation) 
or l&l (no violation). However, his monitoring and inspection 
procedure doe? not provide him with perfectly reliable infor- 
mation. Let 1 be a reading of emissions th$t the monitoring 
and inspection procedure registers. Let q(l(1,sm) be the re- 
liability pdf that characterizes the quality of sm. Let qo bc 
the state "violation occurs (l>sl)" and ql the state 
"no violation occurs ( 1 ) .  The probabilistic relationship 
between the violation and detection states Qo,Q1,qo,ql can be 
expressed in a fourfold table: 
's are the joint probabilities and the marginals Where the pi ja  : 
are defined 
pD(ql Id,sl) = pr [l>sl Id] 
~ ~ ( ~ ~ ~ d , s l , s m )  =Pr[?&l (d,sm] 
From the above definitions the marginal probabilities (40a) and 
(49b) can be directly inferred: 
The consequences that accrue to the developer depend, 
however, not on the true states of violation q but rather on k the states of detection Qk. These probabilities cag usually not 
be inferred directly. But with the knowledge of g (1 11 ,sm) the 
joint probabilities pi, can be determined as follows: 
A 
Po, = I I f (lid) g(11,srn) dldi , 
k s l  1 6 1  
Plo = I / f(11d) g(?l,srn) dldi , 
i>sl 1 6 1  
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F i g u r e  2. Graphic  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  P r o b a b i l i s t i c  
R e l a t i o n s h i p  between V i o l a t i o n s  and D e t e c t i o n s  
(39-42) 
The m a r g i n a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  pD(Qo) and p D ( Q 1 )  ,
can now be  de te rmined  a s  
These d e t e c t i o n  ( n o n - d e t e c t i o n )  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  r e f e r  t o  a  
f i x e d  t i m e  i n t e r v a l  A t .  One c o u l d  assume t h a t  t h i s  t ime  i n t e r -  
v a l  i s  t h e  l i f e t i m e  o f  t h e  p l a n t .  However, it i s  more r e a l i s t i c  
t o  assume t h a t  A t  i s  some "normal" t i m e  i n t e r v a l  of  i n s p e c t i o n  
( e . g .  one  week) .  Then, o v e r  t h e  l i f e t i m e  o f  t h e  p l a n t  T  t h e r e  
w i l l  be  T / A t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  such  d e t e c t i o n .  L e t  n  T/At; 
assuming t h a t  d e t e c t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r e  c o n s t a n t  o v e r  t i m e  and 
independen t ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  no d e t e c t i o n  d u r i n g  T,  l a b e l l e d  
n  Q,, i s  
The probability of at least one detection during TI labelled 
Q 1 1  is 
The consequences accruing to the developer during T as ex- 
pressed in fD are now assumed to depend only on d.ss, and Qi. 
(That is, as far as the developer is concerned, one detection 
is as bad as n) : 
As a further decomposition of the impactee's pdf fA is 
concerned, the emission standards model follows the route of 
the safety standards model as expressed in (35)- However, in 
emission standards, the picture gets simplified since pA(slld) 
= 1 . Theref ore, (35) becomes 
Equation (46) expresses the usual view of the pollution problem 
as mediated through the levels of discharges into the environ- 
ment. For each specific level probable consequences follow for 
the impactees. Equation (46) is the first step in the direction 
of decomposing the chain of events from emissions, over ambient 
distributions to final value relevant consequences. One could 
include another probability density function over ambient levels. 
One could then condition the consequence distribution f A  on 
ambient levels, rather than on emission levels, and define the 
total consequence distribution as a mixture of emission, ambient 
and t h e  r e s p e c t i v e l y  condi t ioned  consequence d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  
g iven ambient l e v e l s .  
The f u l l  u t i l i t y  equa t ions  can now be w r i t t e n  o u t  f o r  t h e  
emiss ion s t anda rds  model: 
u A ( d I a )  = $ [l f (lid) . f A A a  d l ]  
C~ 
I n  summary, r e g u l a t i o n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  were decomposed i n t o  
s t a n d a r d s ,  moni tor ing and i n s p e c t i o n  procedures ,  and s a n c t i o n s .  
S a f e t y  s t anda rds  were cons idered  t o  be s e t  d i r e c t l y  on D.  The 
- 
monitoring and i n s p e c t i o n  procedure  was assumed t o  be f a l l i b l e  
l ead ing  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  misses  o r  f a l s e  a larms i n  
r e g u l a t i o n  v i o l a t i o n  d e t e c t i o n .  This  was t h e  main v e h i c l e  f o r  
decomposing f D .  To decompose f A  it was assumed t h a t  p o l l u t i o n  
amounts a r e  f u l l y  determined by s,, t h e  p o l l u t i o n  gene ra t ing  
e v e n t s ,  and t h e  deve loper  d e c i s i o n  d. p o l l u t i o n  amcunts and 
impactee a c t i o n  a l o n e  determine t h e  probable  consequences f o r  
t h e  impactee. The f i n a l  u t i l i t y  equa t ion  f o r  t h e  s a f e t v  
s t anda rds  model a r e  (36-38) . 
The emiss ion s t anda rd  model, (47)  - (49)  assumed t h a t  a  
maximum l e v e l  of  emiss ions  s l  i s  s e t  by t h e  r e g u l a t o r ,  t h a t  
p o l l u t i o n  g e n e r a t i n g  even t s  SA a r e  reduced t o  "normal ope ra t ion"  
f o r  each d ,  t h a t  a c t u a l  l e v e l s  produced by d  a r e  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  
and can on ly  be d e t e c t e d  wi th  e r r o r .  This  l e d  t o  a  r a t h e r  
s p e c i f i c  d e f i n i t i o n  of d e t e c t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and a  decompo- 
s i t i o n  of f  . f A  was decomposed a s  i n  t h z  s a f e t y  s t anda rd  
model b u t  Dit was s i m p l i f i e d ,  s i n c e  p o l l u t i o n  gene ra t ing  
even t s  were reduced t o  normal o p e r a t i o n s .  
POSSIBLE USES OF THE DECISION THEORETIC MODEL 
The model that has been developed here is a decision 
theoretic formulation of the regulatory decision problem in 
standard setting and it gives a stepwise solution of how a 
regulator might think of going through the standard setting 
task to solve the problem. The model prescribes an "optimal" 
standard setting solution that is consistent with the decision 
maker's preferences and opinions. However, the question 
arises of how the model can be applied in its full complexity 
to a real problem, and what its main uses and limitations are. 
There seem to be five ways in which a regulator could benefit 
from the use of the model. The model can help 
- to structure the regulation problem; 
- to enable regulators and their experts to express uncer- 
tainties, and intaqibles in quantitative forms; 
- to make trade-offs explicit; 
- to identify a set of good regulatory solutions; 
- to allow a study of the sensitivities of the regulatory 
soluticn.to conflicting opinions, values, and information. 
Structurins the Resulation.Problem 
The model provides a cognitive structure or roadmap along 
which the regulator can organize his thinking. Some of the 
main distinctions that the model makes are those between con- 
sequences, their values and probabilities, and between three 
decision-making units involved in regulation. Even if none of 
tha further steps could be achieved (quantitative estimation 
of probability density functions, quantification of values) 
the nodel could already in this respect be an aid for the 
regulator. 
Enablinq Requlators and Experts to Express Uncertainties and 
~ntansibles~in a ~uantitative Form. - 
In this presentation of the model the details of the actual 
quantification procedures were not given, although some methods 
were outlined on p.8. But through its simplifying assumptions 
the model is designed such that regulators and their experts 
can, in principle, perform the actual quantification tasks, 
both on the uncertainty and the value side. The model requires 
at no step to construct functions that would be very difficult 
to assess in practice (although by doing so it had to make some 
severe simplifying assumptions). The tools for such quantifi- 
cation exist and have been extensively explored in the labora- 
tory and in real world decision problems. It remains a task 
of a model application to see how far one can go with the actual 
quantification steps in standard setting and regulations. 
Makina Trade-offs Explicit 
The model requires this directly Sy postulating quantita- 
tive trade-offs within each decision making unit (the vi in 
the additive value function v-), by postulating a 
risk transformations (the h ) ,  and by postulating trade-offs 
among decision units (the A ; ) .  Again, the question remains 
whether these weights and parameters that reflect the trade- 
offs can be realistically assessed. But the literature on 
multi-attribute utility theory and its applications indicate 
that a quantification of such trade-offs can be feasible. 
Identifvina a set of sood standard solutions 
The general regulation model (21-23), the safety standards 
model (36-38), and the emission standards model (47-49) all end 
up with the three utilities accruing to the regulator, the 
developer, and the impactee respectively, given that the latter 
two units take actions which are "optimal" in the decision 
theoretic sense. The search for a good standard solution can 
begin with an examination of the optimal developer and impactee 
responses d(r) and a[d(r)l. Then a Pareto optimality analysis 
can be applied on UR, UD, and UA to eliminate obviously unsatis- factory standards. Finally a weighting scheme such as ( 2 6 )  can 
be used to further explore the changes in utility as a function 
of r. 
allowing a Study of the Sensitivities of the Regulatory Solution 
to Conflictins Values, Opinions, and Deqrees of ~nformation 
In each step the values, trade-offs, and probability 
density functions were made explicit based on a set of infor- 
mation that the regulator had at hand. Each of these parameters 
and information variables can he pushed around to see in which 
areas the model is most sensitive. For example, one could run 
the whole model based on some information provided by developers 
or impactees, to see if such different information sources would 
lead to different standard solutions. Furthermore, one could 
analyze if different weights or trade-offs would change the 
solution, etc. Finally, as an important output of the model 
one can compute the value of perfect information (see DeGroot, 
1970), and the value of sample information. This could then be 
an important input for future budgeting decisions to set up re- 
search programs to improve standards. 
Decision makers and analysts will probably find many formal 
and substantive limitations of the model presented here, ranging 
from criticisms that it is an overformalization of a very com- 
plex political process to specific criticisms of independence 
assumptions made in the model. Probably the most persuasive way 
to meet these criticisms are successful applications of the 
model. Within IIASA1s research on standard setting one such 
application (on chronic oil discharge standards) has been com- 
pleted, another one (on noise standards) is in process. In con- 
junction with these applications a final evaluation of the model 
presented here will be possible. 
APPENDIX 
In this appendix the additive decomposition of an algebraic 
difference function and the linear or exponential relationship 
between a von Neumann and Morgenstern function u and the differ- 
ence function v will be derived from behavioral axioms. 
Let (CxC,>> be an algebraic difference structure (Krantz 
et al., 1971). Let - c = (cl ,c2.. . . ,ci1. .. .cn) E C  and let (cld)e 
- - 
(c' - ,dl) - be defined as (c,d) - - > (cv1d') - - and (c1,d') - > (2.d). 
Ci is said to be difference value independent of X C if and 
0 
jfi J 
only if for all ci1di ECilc ,dO€c jfi the following condition j I j1 
holds : 
0 0 0 0 0 (clt C2# - - - I  c ~ - ~  1 di 1 ci+l ' ... I c,)] 
Decomposition of v 
-- 
Let <CxC,>> be an algebraic difference structure with 
difference value functicn v as defined in (4). If for all i=l, 
2#. . . ln-ll is difference value independent of X C then 
there existC$unctions vi :Ci% such that jfi j1 
It is clear that difference value independence is necessary for 
(51) to hold. To prove sufficiency an approach by ~ishburn 
(1970) for additive utility functions is followed. Consider 
the following n-1 indifference equations which are a result of 
the difference value independence condition for arbitrary 
0 0 0 [ ( c l I  C2t - - - I  C i-1 ' c i I  c ~ + ~ ,  . . . I cn) I 
since <cxc,>> is an algebraic difference structure from (4) 
and (52) the following n-1 difference equations can be derived: 
Adding up the left and right terms and cancelling the fourth 
term of equation (53.i) against the third term of (53.i+l) for 
all i results in 
Defining - c0 = and 
gives the desired result: 
The next decomposition is a well known result in expected 
utility theory. It is based on the definition of utility inde- 
pendence introduced by Keeney (see Keeney, 1974; Keeney and 
~aiffaT1976). In the present terminology utility independence 
can be formulated as follows. 
Let *,?> ,be an expected utility structure as defined in 
(3). Let fl, g1 be any two probability density functions with 
identical degenerate marginal probability densities fi(ci)= 
gi(ci)=l for some ciECi, but otherwise unrestricted. X C is 
j#i j 
said to be utility independent of Ci if the preference among 
f l and gi does not depend on the specific value of ci with 
unity density. Weaker formulations of utility independence can 
be found in Keeney (1974); Fishburn and Keeney (1974); von 
Winterfeldt and Fischer (1975); Keeney and Raiffa (1976). The 
result of utility independence together with the assumption of 
a von Neumann and Morgensbzrn utility function over C is the 
following decomposition: 
Let u be a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function 
over C. Let X C be utility independent of Ci for all i. Then 
jpi j 
there exist functions ui: Ci* such that either 
The proof can be found in the papers cited above. 
To relate u and v the following uniqueness theorem for 
additive order preserving functions is observed (see Krantz 
et all 1971)*: If a function V:C* is additive and preserves 
*A similar proof based on constant risk aversion arguments has 
been provided by Pratt and Meyer in Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
t h e  o r d e r  o f  C ,  and i f  t h e r e  i s  a n o t h e r  f u n c t i o n  v1:c-*6i w i t h  t h e  
same p r o p e r t y  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t  real  numbers a,B,a>O s u c h  t h a t  
T h i s  p r o p e r t y ,  now u s e d  t o  r e l a t e  u  and  v  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  
o r d e r s  i and o v e r  C, which  by ( 7 )  a r e  i d e n t i c a l .  
I f  ( 5 1 )  and  ( 5 6 )  h o l d  u  and  v  a r e  b o t h  a d d i t i v e  and  o r d e r  
p r e s e r v i n g  f u n c t i o n s  from c*. 
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e r e  e x i s t  a>O,B such  t h a t  
I f  ( 5 1 )  a n d  ( 5 7 )  h o l d ,  t h e n  f i r s t  ( 5 7 )  needs  t o  b e  t r a n s f o r m e d  
i n t o  a n  a d d i t i v e  o r d e r  p r e s e r v i n g  f u n c t i o n  b e f o r e  t h e  un ique -  
n e s s  theorem c a n  b e  a p p l i e d .  Two cases have  t o  b e  d i s t i n -  
g u i s h e d :  i f  00, t h e n  l+ku  i n  (57 )  i s  a n  o r d e r  p r e s e r v i n g  
f u n c t i o n .  I f  k<O t h e n  l+ku  h a s  a n  i n v e r s e  c r d e r .  
C o n s i d e r  0 0  f i r s t :  
n  
R n [ l + k ~ ]  = R n [  ll (1+kui) 1 , 
i = l  
S i n c e  ( l t k u )  i s  o r d ~ r  p r e s e r v i n g  and  Rn i s  s t r i c t l y  
i n c r e a s i n g ,  Rn (1 +ku) i s  a l s o  o r d e r  p r e s e r v i n g .  T h e r e f o r e  ( 6 0 )  
i s  a n  a d d i t i v e  o r d e r  p r e s e r v i n g  f u n c t i o n .  By u n i q u e n e s s ,  t h e r e  
e x i s t  a>O,B s u c h  t h a t  
where k>O and  a > 0 .  
I f  kc0  t h e n  ( l + k u )  i s  a n  i n v e r s e  o r d e r .  S i n c e  Rn i s  
s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  Rdl+ku)  i s  a n  i n v e r s e  o r d e r ,  and  
i s  a g a i n  a n  a d d i t i v e  o r d e r  p r e s e r v i n g  f u n c t i o n .  By u n i q u e n e s s ,  
t h e r e  e x i s t  a>O,B s u c h  t h a t  
where  k<O, a>0. 
( 5 8 ) ,  ( 6 2 )  , and  ( 6 5 )  are  t h e  d e s i r e d  r e s u l t s .  
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